Enforcement of judgment debt against personal pension

A claimant obtained judgment for a sum of money against an individual whose only available asset for enforcement was their personal pension. The Claimant transferred their interest in the judgment to the applicant. The applicant obtained injunctive relief, requiring the individual to draw-down a lump sum from their pension and for the pension provider to pay that lump sum to the applicant in settlement of the judgment debt. The case provides an example of what is known as a Blight v Brewster order being granted and sets out the relevant factors considered by the court when considering applications for such an order.

Written by Thomas Horton, instructed by Humphries Kerstetter LLP on behalf of the Claimant. 

Eville & Jones (Group) Ltd and another company v Aldiss and other companies [2025] EWHC 1348 (KB)

What are the practical implications of this case?  

The case provides a structured three-stage approach that practitioners can consider and apply when considering making an application for a Blight v Brewster order and which can be applied in drafting evidence and submissions provided in support of the same.

The approach consists of, firstly, identifying what benefits are available to the judgment debtor under the terms and conditions of their personal pension and which can ultimately be used to satisfy the judgment debt.

Secondly, considering whether it is just and convenient to order the judgment debtor to take steps to elect or draw-down those benefits and for the same to be used to satisfy the judgment debt. The case identifies a distillation of the relevant factors to be considered at this stage.

Thirdly, considering whether the judgment debtor’s conduct satisfies the threshold for the inclusion of default provisions in a Blight v Brewster order, that is, whether the debtor has ‘already shown the court that he does and will refuse to do the act which is ordered to be done’ ([34]-[35]). The default provisions in a Blight v Brewster order permit an applicant’s solicitors to complete relevant pension draw-down paperwork should the judgment debtor fail to comply with those parts of the order requiring them to complete such paperwork.

What was the background?  

The Claimants and the First Defendant (“D1”) agreed a Tomlin order, which was approved on 27.7.2023 (“the Tomlin Order”).

The Tomlin Order required D1 to pay to the Claimants £450,000 in two instalments: £150,0000 by 28.10.2023 and £300,000 by 28.9.2025, with the second instalment being paid from D1’s personal pension (“the Pension Fund”). The Tomlin Order also provided that should D1 fail to pay the first instalment in time, the entire £450,000 would become immediately due and payable.

Save for a payment of £47,500 on 30.10.2023, D1 failed to comply with the first instalment obligation under the Tomlin Order and the balance of £402,500 became immediately due and payable to the Claimants.

The Claimants obtained judgment against D1 for £402,500 (“the Judgment Debt”).

The Claimants transferred their interest in the Judgment Debt to Century Property (Leeds) Limited (“the Applicant”).

The Applicant obtained a charging order over the Pension Fund for the Judgment Debt and then made an application for an order to obtain injunctive relief requiring D1 to draw-down a lump sum from the Pension Fund and for the pension provider to pay that lump sum to the Applicant in settlement of the Judgment Debt, pursuant to ss. 37 and 39 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and the court’s decisions in Blight v Brewster [2012] EWHC 165 (Ch) and subsequent cases.

What did the court decide?  

Identifying the three-stage approach summarized above ([36]), Andrew Kinnier KC, firstly, identified that D1 was entitled to take benefits from the Pension Fund upon reaching the age of 55 on 17.8.2025, including a Pension Commencement Lump Sum or an Uncrystallised Funds Pension Lump Sum, with 25% of any such lump sum being taken tax free, up to a limit of £268,275 ([37]). Further, nothing in the pension documents restricted the court’s ability to make a Blight v Brewster order ([38]). 

Secondly, in deciding whether it was just and convenient to grant injunctive relief requiring D1 to draw-down a lump sum from the Pension Fund and for the pension provider to pay that lump sum to the Applicant in settlement of the Judgment Debt, Andrew Kinnier KC, upon consideration and a helpful summary ([23]-[35]) of the previously decided cases of Blight v Brewster, Bacci v Green [2022] EWHC 486 (Ch), Brake v Guy [2022] EWHC 1746 (Ch) and Lindsay v O’Loughnane [2022] EWHC 1829 (QB), identified the relevant factors to consider. Those factors are, albeit not limited to ([53]): whether there is sufficient money in the pension fund; whether any tax consequences of any draw-down would extinguish the benefit to be accrued; the presence or absence of any other creditors; the availability or unavailability of any other assets to enforce the Judgment Debt against; the timing and necessity of the application; and D1’s conduct throughout the history of the proceedings. Each of these factors were decided in the Applicant’s favour.

It was also a ‘substantial factor’ that the effect of a Blight v Brewster order would largely reflect the agreement reached in the Tomlin Order, which provided for D1’s use of the Pension Fund to pay the balance of the sums payable ([52]).

Thirdly, in deciding whether D1’s conduct satisfies the threshold for the inclusion of default provisions in a Blight v Brewster order, Andrew Kinnier KC granted such default provisions upon consideration of the Applicant’s evidence identifying, inter alia, D1’s failure to comply with court orders and delay tactics ([56]-[57]).