Gable Insurance AG v Dewsall & Ors [2025] EWCA Civ 884

Daniel Feetham KC and Rowan Pennington-Benton (instructed by Madison Legal Limited) for the Appellant

Sir Launcelot Henderson:

Introduction and background

• In this expedited appeal the third defendant, Mrs Judith Dewsall (“Mrs Dewsall”), challenges various orders and directions made by Caroline Shea KC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court in the Business List of the Business and Property Courts (“the Judge”). These orders and direction were made after a hearing on the first fully effective return date of a worldwide freezing order (“WFO”) originally made in private and without notice by His Honour Judge Davis-White KC, sitting as a High Court Judge, on 26 November 2024, on the application of the claimant, which is a Liechtenstein-incorporated insurance company in liquidation called Gable Insurance AG (“GIAG”). The three main respondents to the WFO were Mr William Dewsall (“Mr Dewsall”), his wife Mrs Dewsall and a limited liability partnership (Horatio Risk Consulting LLP) (“HRC”), of which Mr and Mrs Dewsall are the only members.

• Although GIAG was incorporated in Liechtenstein, it was managed and carried on its main business in London. At all material times before the business collapsed in 2017, its chief executive officer (“CEO”) was Mr Dewsall. The collapse was precipitated by regulatory concerns in Liechtenstein about the solvency of the business. In the present English proceedings, which were begun by the liquidators in November 2022, GIAG claims that Mr Dewsall (who is the first defendant) misappropriated approximately £19 million from GIAG between 2010 and 2017, and that he used the misappropriated money to fund a lavish lifestyle for himself and his family, including his then partner and now wife Mrs Dewsall. The second defendant, Michael Hirschfield (“Mr Hirschfield”), is the former Finance Director of GIAG. The gist of the claim against him is that he knowingly permitted and assisted in the misappropriations, and is liable for them on that basis.

• The matrimonial home of Mr and Mrs Dewsall was, until recently, a substantial country property called Weald Hall in Essex. Mr Dewsall was the sole registered proprietor, but it appears that he purported to transfer the whole beneficial interest in the property to Mrs Dewsall by a Deed of Trust dated 26 October 2012. The validity of this transfer has never been accepted by GIAG, but it is fair to say that no steps have ever been taken by GIAG to set it aside. When GIAG first learned of its existence in 2023, the property was on the market for sale with an asking price of £7 million. Following a long and tangled history, which it is unnecessary to recount but which appears to reflect little credit on Mr and Mrs Dewsall, it was eventually sold for approximately £4.2 million and under a court order the net proceeds of sale, amounting to some £850,000, were paid into court.

• At an early stage of the English proceedings, prompted in part by the marketing of Weald Hall and partly by the sale of some valuable cars the proceeds of which were deposited into Mrs Dewsall’s bank account in June 2023, GIAG made an application without notice for a WFO against Mr Dewsall which was granted on 25 July 2023 by Jonathan Hilliard KC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge. By his order sealed on 26 July 2023, which it is convenient to refer to as “WFO1”, the Deputy Judge made a WFO in substantially standard form restraining Mr Dewsall from removing from England and Wales any of his assets which were in the jurisdiction up to a value of some £18.7 million, or in any way disposing of, dealing with or diminishing the value of any of his assets whether they were in or outside England and Wales up to the same value. Specific provision was made in relation to Weald Hall or its proceeds of sale, and three motor vehicles listed in a schedule. The order was limited in duration until a return date on 18 August 2023 or further order of the court.

• The next stage in the proceedings was a consent order (“the Consent Order”) made by Michael Green J on 17 August 2023, which compromised an application by GIAG to continue WFO1, and an application by both Mr and Mrs Dewsall, who were represented at the hearing by solicitors and counsel, to discharge WFO 1. In short, it was agreed that the injunction granted by WFO 1 should be revoked and replaced with undertakings given to the court by Mr and Mrs Dewsall. The undertakings given by Mr Dewsall broadly corresponded to the substantive relief against him contained in WFO 1, with the addition of specific provision permitting the Dewsalls to market and sell Weald Hall at arm’s length and to use the proceeds to buy a new home anywhere in the world, on terms that the existing undertaking would then be transferred to any substitute property, and any surplus proceeds of sale of Weald Hall would also continue to be so bound.

• The undertaking given by Mrs Dewsall (referred to in the Consent Order as “Ms Dewsall”) is important, and I need to record its exact terms:

“Ms Dewsall’s undertaking

5. Subject to what is said at paragraph 6 below, Ms Dewsall undertakes that she will not remove from England and Wales or in any other way dispose of, deal with, or diminish the value of the Proceeds of Sale and/or the New Property (and any balance from the Proceeds of Sale).

6. Nothing in the undertaking given at paragraph 5 above will prevent Ms Dewsall from dealing with the Proceeds of Sale in a manner consistent with the exceptions permitted by paragraphs 12-15 of the WFO, had she been a respondent to the WFO.”

• The exceptions in paragraphs 12 to 15 of WFO 1 were of a standard nature, and included provision for expenditure on ordinary living expenses and on obtaining legal advice and representation in the following terms:

“12. This order does not prohibit the Respondent from spending £5,000 a week (or any equivalent sum in a foreign currency) towards his ordinary living expenses and also a reasonable sum on legal advice and representation. The permitted sums for legal expenses include those in relation to any defence to the claim. But before spending any money the Respondent must tell the Applicant’s legal representatives where the money is to come from.”

• When she gave her undertaking, Mrs Dewsall had not yet been joined as a party to the proceedings; but this was on the agenda at the case management conference (“CMC”) held before Master Pester on 22 February 2024, when an application by GIAG to amend the particulars of claim and to join Mrs Dewsall and HRC as the third and fourth defendants was adjourned to a date to be fixed, and in due course the order sought was made by Deputy Master Rhys on 22 March 2024.

• The claim pleaded against Mrs Dewsall is contained in paragraphs 80 to 86 of the amended particulars of claim. The claim has two limbs. The first limb alleges that although Mrs Dewsall was not at any time a director or officer of GIAG, she received two separate groups of payments from GIAG, arranged by Mr Dewsall and/or Mr Hirschfield, over dates ranging from 4 January 2010 to 17 August 2018 via a UK company owned and controlled by Mr Dewsall called Hogarth Underwriting Agencies Ltd (“HUAL”). These alleged payments totalled some £110,000. It is alleged that Mrs Dewsall provided no services to GIAG or HUAL in return for these payments, which were improper. But it is noteworthy that no specific cause of action is pleaded for recovery of these sums from Mrs Dewsall in her personal capacity.

• The second, and more significant, limb relates to Weald Hall. I need not describe it in detail, because it is common ground that it pleads a good arguable case to trace excessive payments allegedly misappropriated from GIAG by Mr Dewsall into (a) 19% of the value of Weald Hall, representing by subrogation a sum of £600,000 paid to the mortgagee of the property in reduction of an original mortgage loan of about £1.7 million, and (b) numerous other payments relating to the improvement and maintenance of the property which total about £1.026 million. Paragraph 85 then explains that since Mr and Mrs Dewsall claim she is the sole beneficial owner of Weald Hall, she is “joined as a potentially interested party”.#

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