Cambridge Country Club Group Ltd v Broome [2025] EWHC 2998 (Ch)

MR SAMUEL McNEIL (instructed by Immisol Solicitors) for the Claimant.

HIS HONOUR JUDGE HODGE KC:

• This is my extemporary judgment on two applications in a claim brought by Cambridge Country Club Group Ltd against Mrs Jane Myott Broome in her capacity as the sole executrix of the estate of her late husband, Mr John Broome, which is proceeding in the Business List of the Business and Property Courts in Manchester under claim number BL-2024-MAN-000016. There is a linked claim number BL-2024-MAN-000012 which was created in connection with the Claimant’s application for a freezing injunction against the Defendant. The claim form was issued on 14 February 2024.

• The brief details of the claim state as follows:

“The Claimants claim is against the Defendant as the executor of the Will of John Lawson Broome (deceased). The Claimant and the deceased signed a Settlement Deed and Release on 10 March 2021 whereby the Claimant agreed to receive a sum of £900,000 (defined as ‘the Settlement Sum’) from the deceased in consideration of settling any dispute in relation to the sale of a leisure park business and resort known as Camel Creek in Cornwall alongside other disputes.

The deceased failed to pay the Settlement Sum.”

• There are supporting particulars of claim which are verified by a statement of truth made by the Claimant’s solicitor, Bahman Rashidi, dated 1 February 2024. Paragraph 3 pleads that:

“On 10 March 2021, the Claimant entered into a Settlement Deed and Release with the deceased whereby the Claimant agreed to receive a sum of £900,000 from the deceased in consideration of settling any dispute in relation to:

(a) the sale of a leisure park business and resort known as Camel Creek in Cornwall;

(b) the acquisition by Time (Cornwall) Ltd of shares in Camel Creek Capital Ltd;

(c) monies paid and/or payable to the deceased pursuant to arrangements between the deceased and Camel Creek Capital Ltd and Camel Creek Ltd.”

Paragraph 4 pleads that:

“The deceased would be liable to pay the Settlement Sum to the Claimant upon receiving £1 million in cleared funds pursuant to terms which:

(a) have been agreed between the deceased and [the two main companies]; and

(b) include provision for such sum to be paid to him within three months of planning permission being granted for additional units at the site known as Camel Creek, Tredinnick, Wadebridge PL27 7RA.”

Paragraph 5 pleads that:

“The terms stated in paragraph 4 above were satisfied and the deceased was liable to pay the Settlement Sum to the Claimant pursuant to the Settlement Deed.”

Paragraph 6 pleads that:

“In breach of the terms of the Settlement Deed, the deceased failed to pay the Claimant the Settlement Sum.”

Loss of the Settlement Sum is particularised in the sum of £900,000. There is also a claim for interest.

• The issue of the claim form had been preceded by a without notice application, made by the Claimant’s solicitor, for a freezing injunction against the Defendant. That came on for hearing before HHJ Bever on 5 February 2024. No notice of the hearing had been given to the Defendant, and so she did not attend. Judge Bever found that the application failed to comply with the applicable provisions of the Civil Procedure Rules and the related Practice Direction 25A. He found that there was no reference to the Applicant offering any undertaking to pay damages to the Respondent if the court determined that it should do so; there was no evidence as to why notice of the application should not be given to the Respondent; there was no draft order attached to the application notice; and there was no clarification of the basis on which the order should be made. The judge’s order recorded that the Applicant’s solicitor confirmed that notice of the Applicant’s intention to seek an injunction had been communicated to the Respondent as long before the hearing as 13 January 2024. In light of that, it could not be said that there was any need to proceed by stealth. The order also recorded that the Applicant’s solicitor no longer sought an injunction order on a without notice basis. Having made those recordings, Judge Bever adjourned the application; and he directed that it should be relisted, on notice, on 8 February, to be heard remotely by Microsoft Teams. He abridged time for service of the application and the order; and he reserved the costs of the hearing.

• The return date came on for hearing before HHJ Halliwell on 8 February 2024. The Claimant was represented by counsel (not the counsel who appears for the Claimant today). The Respondent appeared as a litigant in person, in the presence, and with the assistance, of her daughter, Ms Georgina Clavel. The matter was disposed of on cross-undertakings. The court directed that the Applicant should issue a claim form seeking substantive relief against the Respondent by no later than 4.00 p.m. on 15 February 2024. Paragraph 3 of the order provided that the Respondent might apply to the court at any time to vary or discharge the order, and/or be released from her undertakings, subject to first informing the Claimant’s solicitors in writing at least 48 hours in advance. The costs were reserved.

• There was an unfortunate hiccup in the proceedings in that, whilst still acting as a litigant in person, the Defendant failed to give notice of intention to defend the claim. That led to the entry of a judgment in default against the Defendant for over £1 million. That in turn led to an application to have that default judgment set aside, which was eventually granted by HHJ Halliwell on 12 November 2024. HHJ Halliwell ordered that the costs should be costs in the case.

• In due course, the Defendant filed and served a detailed defence to the claim which was settled by Mr Elis Gomer (of counsel), acting on her behalf on a pro bono basis.

• There are two applications presently before the court. The first in point of time is the Claimant’s application dated 6 March 2025. That seeks permission to amend the particulars of claim, although not in terms the claim form, and also to add the Defendant’s daughter, Ms Georgina Clavel, as a co-defendant to the proceedings. That application was not supported by any witness statement. The only evidence relied upon in support of that application is that set out in box 10 of the application notice. That states that:

“Permission is sought to amend the particulars of claim, a copy of which is enclosed, and to add Ms Georgina Clavel as a Defendant to the proceedings in accordance with CPR rule 19.4(1). As we have not yet been directed to file direction questionnaires, amending the particulars of claim, and adding an additional defendant, will not prejudice the defendants.”

• That application came on for hearing before DJ Banks on 9 April 2025. It had been listed for 30 minutes, with 10 minutes judicial pre-reading. That was in accordance with the Claimant’s estimate in the notice of application. There is a dispute between the parties as to whether the Defendant only received notice of the hearing of the application dated 6 March as shortly before the hearing as 7 April. That assertion is recorded in the recitals to DJ Banks’s order.

• The order records that the Defendant is a litigant in person and had been unable to obtain pro bono representation in time for the hearing, otherwise than for the purpose of providing a skeleton argument from Mr Gomer. DJ Banks recorded that, in light of the wholesale amendments proposed to the Claimant’s claim, the continuation and/or variation of the freezing injunction obtained by the Claimant would need to be reconsidered. He recorded that the 30 minutes time estimate for the hearing was insufficient for the matters to be properly considered. He therefore ordered that, if and in the event that the Defendant sought the variation or discharge of the freezing injunction in the event that the Claimant’s application was successful, she was, by 4.00 p.m. on 22 May, to file and serve an application notice, together with any evidence in support. He then adjourned the matter to the next available date after 28 days. He directed that it should be relisted as follows: (a) in the event that the Defendant made an application for discharge, the matter was to be relisted before a section 9 Deputy High Court Judge, with an estimated length of hearing of two hours (plus 30 minutes pre-reading); (b) in the event that the Defendant did not make such an application, the matter was to be relisted before a BPC District Judge (or Deputy), with an estimated length of hearing of one-and-a-half hours (plus 30 minutes pre-reading). He reserved the costs.

Continue reading this Judgment here.